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SOCIAL ETHICS AND ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURES INFLUENCING THE
ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE IN
GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES
Alfred E. Miller
I. ETHICAL ISSUES AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
THE ALLOCATION OF HEALTH CARE-WHY PROBLEMS
OF SOCIAL JUSTICE DIFFER FROM THOSE OF INDIVIDUAL
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR AND CALL FOR VERY DIFFERENT
APPROACHES
Addressing ethical problems concerning the allocation of health care or
other social goods and services requires understanding their special nature
and finding strategies for solutions in ways that are quite different from
individual ethical behavior in particular situations. On the one hand,
allocation issues are correctly considered in terms of social justice and
what ought to be available to all persons as their right in order to have the
opportunity for a fulfilled life. On the other hand, if we analyze these
issues in terms of concepts, decision processes and types of actions that are
appropriate for individual ethical behavior, it is easy to overlook the
important distinctions needed in dealing with allocation problems.
Typically, ethical behavior occurs in specific situations, at particular
times and requires single individuals to act according to certain criteria to
achieve immediate concrete ends. By contrast, the factors, criteria and
social structures that affect the allocation of social goods and resources
(social justice) are usually the result of collective decisions made
cumulatively over generations. Uncritical extrapolation of approaches,
appropriate for individual ethical behavior applied to problems of social
justice, clouds the issues at stake, hides the true nature of the problems
and hinders developing realistic solutions. Ordinary ethical behavior is
usually a consequence of individuals both deliberating and implementing
their own actions. Achieving social justice depends on the historical
development of an entire society and requires long-term strategies and
concerted, collective action to redress inequities.
Uncritical consideration of allocation problems in terms appropriate for
individual ethical behavior can make it seem as if an identifiable mistake
in ethical judgment-or some specific factor or even some conspiracy-
were responsible for the existing injustice. This simplistic approach
prevents us from understanding the complex structural nature and
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historical dynamic of the underlying problems that obstruct achieving the
widely desired, mutually advantageous goals. Looking for single causes
and final solutions for obvious problems, results in overlooking the subtle
but powerful interactions between competing interests and goals and how
these interests ultimately impact the allocation decision process. As long
as we fail to understand the underlying structural nature of the problems,
it is impossible to arrive at realistic strategies for reshaping the faulty
mechanisms responsible for the lack of proper allocation of resources and
services.
Despite basing seemingly appropriate ethical decisions about allocation
on system-wide analysis and working at the political level to implement
corrective action, they often remain inadequate for dealing effectively with
the kinds of problems involved. In the U.S., political decisions and
political processes in the traditional sense have frequently been
inadequate for reaching consensus or even for implementing actions that
are widely agreed upon. Political mandates, such as those given in
national elections, have not succeeded in bringing about the reform of the
overall system necessary to make health care financially available to all,
while keeping the costs in bounds. A central plank in the winning 1992
election platform was health care reform including some form of national
health insurance. Public opinion polls, professional consensus and other
indicators showed that there was firm political support for major reform of
the health insurance system. Nevertheless, powerful lobbying and
massively financed public opinion campaigns were able to derail the effort
to enact the necessary legislation.' Where entrenched vested interests are
threatened by the proposed changes, the implementation of political
decisions regarding the necessary reforms seems to require more than a
political mandate in the usual sense.
Thus, allocation and its control have to be understood in terms of the
overall system that provides the services and how it developed under the
influence of multiple political and other collective actions and social
1. In retrospect, it is clear that failure to enact the electorally mandated
legislation was primarily due to opposition from the vested interests threatened by
the changes, rather than by inadequacy of the proposals. On the one hand, no
serious alternative plan was put forward by opponents for reaching the same
desired goals. On the other hand, the proposed cost savings by increased use of
managed care (which were maligned as 'rationing' by the opposition) have now
been widely put in place in order to save costs by the same groups who opposed
them then, but without the originally proposed regulatory framework that would
have assured much of the consumer protection now being sought in the so-called
"Health Care Bill of Rights."
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changes. Comparison of the structure and history of the U.S. and German
health care systems and the ways in which they provide and allocate
services provides a striking case study of how subtle but powerful
differences in the structure of the systems as a whole profoundly
influences the outcome in terms of availability and cost.
II. OVERALL SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
GERMAN HEALTH SYSTEMS -BUT DIFFERENT OUTCOMES
IN REGARD TO ALLOCATION AND COSTS
In the U.S. and Germany the basic components of the health system for
delivering and financing health care are quite similar. Both systems are
comprised of a mix of public and private organizations and service/fiscal
relationships. Most medical services are provided on a private basis, while
publicly operated services constitute a small sector of care for indigent or
other special population groups. In addition, both countries finance the
private delivery of care through an insurance system of payment, funded
in part by employment-related premiums and in part by government-
operated funds, that make the private delivery system accessible to certain
parts of the population (particularly retirees and others not covered by the
employment-based premium system).
Despite these basic structural similarities in the manner of delivery and
financing of care, however, the outcomes in terms of allocation and cost of
services are strikingly different in the two countries. The German health
system provides essentially universal insurance coverage and a full range
of benefits, including dental care and pharmaceuticals, with very little co-
payment or restriction on utilization except for the peer-review by the
physician associations. By contrast, the U.S. system leaves over forty
million (fifteen percent) of the most needy with no health insurance at all
and many more with inadequate benefits or high co-payments that act as
serious barriers to utilization. Moreover, as a cost-saving measure in
recent years, U.S. health insurers have increasingly instituted various
forms of managed care to limit utilization by restricting the discretion of
both consumers and providers.
At the same time, the German system provides more complete
coverage and fuller benefit package at considerably less cost per capita
than the more limited and restricted U.S. system. After the cost explosion
of the 1960s in both countries, the West German health care budget was
held at just above eight percent of GDP from the mid-1970s until
reunification, while U.S. health expenditures continued to rise to over
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fourteen percent of GDP at present and are expected to reach sixteen
percent of GDP by 2010.2 Yet in spite of the much higher rate of health
expenditures in the U.S., there is no indication that it results in better
outcomes or leads to greater satisfaction with the care received. Health
indicators such as infant mortality, life expectancy and overall public
satisfaction with health care are at least as good and often considerably
better in Germany than in the U.S. Moreover, in the face of ingrained,
often conflicting interests of the parties concerned (quite similar to those
in the U.S.), the German system has succeeded in accommodating to
major changing problems and needs of the population (e.g., the cost
explosion beginning in the 1960s, absorption of the East German (GDR)
health system and population and the growing need for long-term care as
the population ages).
By contrast the U.S. health care system has repeatedly failed to
accommodate to similar challenges. The German system is more highly
regulated than the U.S. system, and regulation is strongly rejected in the
U.S. as an acceptable solution for economic or service problems of this
sort. However, the highly successful regulation of the German health
system occurs largely by way of reaching negotiated consensus among all
the parties involved. Unlike unilateral regulation, negotiation as a means
of resolving disputes or reaching consensus among conflicting interests is
generally considered an acceptable approach in this country as well. Why
has it not been possible to negotiate solutions for health care problems in
this country in ways like those employed in Germany? To answer this
question it is necessary to examine the more subtle differences in
structures and traditions of the health systems in the two countries, in
2. See European Observatory on Health Care Systems, Health Care Systems
in Transition: Germany, 177-20 (2000). In the decade after reunification the much
lower per capita GDP in the former East German states (GDR) with essentially
equal per capita health care costs together with the general economic decline
resulting from the economic strain of integrating and rebuilding the Eastern states
led to an increase in the ratio of health expenditures to GDP from eight perceit to
ten percent. However, despite adding major new long-term care benefits to their
health insurance program, evidence suggests that German health expenditures are
holding steady at the new level while U.S. costs continue to rise ominously. See
also Gerard Anderson, et al., Health Tracking Trends: Health Spending and
Outcomes: Trends in OECD Countries, 1960-1998, HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June
2000, at 19; U.S. data from: U.S. Health Care Finance Administration, National
Health Expenditures Projections: 2000-2010; Stephen Hefler, et al., "Health
Spending Growth Up in 1999; Faster Growth Expected in the Future," HEALTH
AFFAIRS, 20 Mar./Apr. 2001, at 193-203.
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particular the fiscal relationships between various components of the two
systems and how they developed.
III. KEY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND GERMAN
HEALTH SYSTEMS: THE REGULATORY AND
NEGOTIATIONAL RELATIONS THAT STEER ECONOMIC
AND SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS
The German health insurance system is privately operated and
performs essentially the same basic functions as those of U.S. health
insurance companies or organizations like Blue Cross/Blue Shield, such as
collecting premiums from employers and/or employees and paying
providers for furnishing services to those who are insured. Nevertheless,
there are important differences in the way the German system is organized
and its relations to the payers and providers. The organization of the
German system makes it possible for the interests of the various
components to be appropriately represented in negotiations that
determine the cost, nature and conditions of services.
Most U.S. health insurers exist as organizations independent of both
consumers and providers and typically are for-profit corporations meaning
their primary responsibility is to their shareholders.' By contrast the
German health insurance and payment system is actually divided into two
parts, which represent the interests of the consumers/payers on the one
hand and the providers on the other hand. The sickness funds (statutory
health insurance organizations) collect premiums from employers and
employees on a 50-50 basis and are governed by boards representing their
payers in the same ratio. These sickness funds negotiate with provider
organizations, such as physician associations, to purchase services for their
consumer members. The physician associations represent their members
in the negotiations and distribute the contributions received in payment
from the sickness funds to their physician members in proportion to the
individual services rendered to beneficiaries. Similar arrangements exist
between the sickness funds and hospitals or other providers.
The German payment system simultaneously comprises a negotiational
framework between providers, payers and consumers. This enables
reaching a consensus that protects the essential interests of all parties.
3. The tremendous variety of different types of health insurance
organizations in the U.S. cannot be considered in the present paper. Since our
primary concern is contrasting the U.S. and German systems, only the pattern-
setting type is discussed, which largely determines how the reimbursement system
works as a whole.
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Each party is organized and represented in such a way that its own
interests are protected, but also the general public interest, since it
remains to the advantage of all parties to balance cost and effectiveness.
This structure allows the parties to reach acceptable compromises while at
the same time maintaining control over the overall cost of care. Sickness
funds represent the common interests of the employers and employees in
obtaining the best care for the best price. Since they represent a large
number of purchasers of services collectively, they have a strong hand in
bargaining with providers. Physician associations and similar
organizations for other providers represent the interests of their members,
but they also have a strong interest in curtailing unnecessary or unfair
utilization generated by providers because they are responsible for
distributing the negotiated overall budget obtained from the sickness
funds to fairly reimburse their individual provider members.
This negotiation and payment arrangement takes place within a
statutory framework supervised and to some degree directly regulated by
government agencies. It is kept on course by modifications of the
underlying law when necessary to maintain the proper balance between
public and private interests. In response to rapidly escalating costs and
other system-wide structural problems, this negotiation process has been
more closely controlled and formally organized under government
supervision in the context of the Konzertierte Aktion (orchestrated
action) for the past twenty-five years. This official arrangement brings all
parties together biannually at the national level to set guidelines for fixed
budgets to be negotiated in detail at more local levels. In addition to the
formal process of negotiation, there is a research and advisory council of
health care experts and representatives of parties concerned with the
mandate to study problems independently and make longer-term
recommendations for needed legislation and administrative adjustments in
the system. These recommendations together with legislative and
administrative actions in the public interest provide further ingredients
shaping the negotiations.
This formal and legally established negotiating system makes the
German health system accountable and responsive to the general public as
well as the specific needs of health care consumers. In addition, the
cabinet system of government (with party responsibility rather than
individual representatives being dependent on campaign contributors)
together with the traditional respect for the fairness and proficiency of the
bureaucratic process enables rapid legislative and regulatory response to
new problems and adjustment of the existing system. This is closely
intertwined with the cultural tradition of expecting the government to
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assure a safety net of social services and accepting the necessary regulation
and limitations needed to make it work. This so-called 'social solidarity
principle' is explicitly written into the laws and regulations governing the
operation of the health insurance system. In turn, the effective operation
of that system in providing needed services at a reasonable cost is an
important part of maintaining confidence in that principle and
commitment to it. Therefore, the cultural norms and social institutions
mutually reinforce each other in enabling the system to work effectively.
IV. STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE PAYMENT
ARRANGEMENTS AND REGULATORY RELATIONS OF THE
U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM THAT ACCOUNT FOR THE
DIFFERENCES IN ALLOCATION AND COST
The U.S. health insurance system, while performing essentially the same
fiscal functions as the German system, provides few of the opportunities or
mechanisms for negotiation to accommodate the various needs and
interests involved-much less on behalf of the general public interest. The
U.S. system has two largely independent sectors. Private insurance is
mainly provided as a fringe benefit of employment, while Medicare and
Medicaid, serve specific populations who have no financial access to
private insurance. The latter are highly regulated as direct federal
programs. The former are essentially unregulated in regard to the efficacy
of their function in the health care system and respond only to market
forces. Insurance companies are typically for-profit and therefore
primarily responsible to their shareholders, not to consumers, providers or
the general public interest. There is little representation of consumers,
providers or employers (as payers) on insurance company boards to
represent their interests in corporate decision-making. Therefore, neither
these groups nor representatives of the general public interest have any
significant leverage over the organizations that largely control health
expenditures and conditions for the provision of services in the private
market-except to the extent that the payers must be wooed within free-
market competition among insurers.
4. As corporations whose stock is publicly traded, health insurers are, of
course, subject to auditing and accounting regulations under which any such
corporations must operate. In addition, as insurance companies they are subject to
the security requirements of state insurance regulations to assure that they can
meet their obligations. None of these requirements, however, in any way regulates
their role within the health system as such major influences on the allocation and
cost of care.
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Even if national health insurance could be enacted legislatively, there is
no existing organizational structure within which representatives of the
various interest groups could negotiate toward consensus or exercise any
coordinated control over the virtually independent components of the
health care payment system as it is presently structured. Physicians are
not organized in associations that could represent their collective
professional and financial interests in exchange for responsible self-control
of costs or mode of providing services. Consumers have no direct interest
in constraining costs since the tax structure encourages full payment of
premiums by employers and have no organized power to do so.
Consequently, they do not adequately support political or administrative
efforts to change the system in ways that would rationalize it, especially
when the changes would potentially restrict their utilization of care. As a
result, cost control is only possible by means of heavy-handed (unilaterally
imposed) regulation in the case of federal programs, and rationing of
budgets and utilization through mechanisms like managed care (largely by
for-profit organizations) in the private sector.
V. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN HEALTH
INSURANCE SYSTEM THAT ACCOUNTS FOR ITS PRESENT
STRUCTURE
Historically speaking, the German national health insurance system was
put in place in 1883, for political motives. It was implemented as a means
of preempting the appeal of socialism and furthering a mercantilist-like
approach to rapid industrialization by encouraging solidarity between
employers, workers and government: The concept of social solidarity and
fair allotment of premium contributions and services received was an
integral part of the original legislation and became an ongoing component
of the cultural tradition. Together with other social insurance programs,
such as unemployment and retirement insurance, national health
insurance was enacted at a time when the German people were more
accepting of paternalistic approachesto problem solving and regulation of
social life. There was little resistance from physicians because medical
care was a luxury of the upper'classes, which still made very little
difference in the outcome of disease. Consequently, the primary objective
of the initial legislation was to provide ongoing income (sickness pay) for
workers who became sick or injured and lost their income while unable to
work. The medical benefits were a minor part of the package so that
physicians did not feel threatened or interested financially. Hospitals at
this time primarily served the poor under the support of church, state or
other charitable or public auspices.
Social Ethics and Organizational Structures
The sickness insurance program originally covered only a small part of
the low-income, blue-collar population, about ten percent of the overall
population. Once in place, however, the program was easily expanded to
more employees by increasing the income level below which insurance was
mandatory and by also making it optionally available to those with higher
incomes who wanted the advantage of being insured for care. By the time
of WWII about ninety percent of the population were covered by
statutory or substitute sickness funds of some. kind with the remaining
(primarily high-income) groups largely covered by some type of private
insurance.
In the early decades of the .20th century as medical care began to make
a significant difference in the outcome of illnesses and became financially
important for all involved, physicians had to organize and negotiate their
way into the existing insurance payment system. Although health
insurance was originally established for blue-collar workers, who
accounted for only a small part of physicians' incomes, its rapid expansion
to meet the growing health care needs of the middle class as well, meant
that it was becoming an important potential source of income for
physicians. Originally, the sickness funds ran clinics themselves and hired
physicians to staff them. Even when independently practicing physicians
were reimbursed for services, the sickness funds were able to control costs
by determining which physicians were allowed access to payment from
their revenues for treating their members. As a result, many physicians
soon were excluded from a major part of the population they wanted to
serve. From 1900 onward, professional associations were organized for
the purpose of gaining professional recognition, setting standards and
acting as collective bargaining and pressure groups to attain the political
and economic goals of their members. They used strikes, boycotts and
other political and economic actions and negotiations to gain wider access
to sickness fund patients. This led incrementally to the present system in
which these physician organizations negotiate payment rates and terms of
service with sickness funds and act as intermediaries to distribute the
agreed-upon payments among their members in accord with the services
provided. This historical development established the negotiating
structure between consumers, payers and providers, which the government
only needs to supervise and correct when costs or power relations grow
out of balance. For example, when costs escalated rapidly and new needs
and problems arose after WWII, it was relatively easy politically to
superimpose a more heavy-handed government regulatory policy and
additional legislation on the existing negotiational structures in order to
correct the problems and deal with the new needs,
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The negotiating structure itself was formalized and incorporated into
the national health insurance law and regulations as it gradually developed
from 1900 onward. The existence of the functional and adaptable
regulatory/negotiating system, together with the long-standing legislative
approach to health care and other social safety-net problems, accustomed
citizens to expect and support the solidarity principle as part of their
cultural tradition. These cultural and political attitudes facilitate
legislative and administrative changes needed to keep the. overall system
in line with the best interests of the population as a whole. In turn, the
effectiveness of the system has enhanced trust in government and created
greater readiness to restrict the basic commitment to free-market
economics, which Germany shares, when increased regulation is necessary
to keep some aspect of the system functioning appropriately and in the
interest of the public at large.
VI. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. HEALTH
INSURANCE SYSTEM AND THE ORGANIZATION OF
FACTORS AND VESTED INTERESTS THAT ACCOUNT FOR
ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE COMPLETE COVERAGE AND
CONTROL COSTS
In contrast to the German system, the U.S. health insurance system
developed in stages, from the bottom up, by way of limited responses to
special financing problems at particular moments in its history. Blue Cross
and Blue Shield plans developed in the late 1920s and early 1930s under
the aegis of hospitals and physicians to assure payment to those
organizations and professionals when the importance and cost of care
became a major concern and potential burden on the middle class.
Commercial health insurance coverage came into widespread existence as
a result of labor union negotiations for health benefits as part of collective
bargaining after WWII, after unions had gained increasing influence and
bargaining power in the preceding decades. When the cost of health care
for the aged grew rapidly in the 1960s and they were unable to obtain
insurance coverage at an affordable price, political pressure arose for the
enactment of Medicare to meet the needs of this key constituent group to
which Congress had to be responsive. Medicaid was enacted as part of the
same legislative movement to provide some degree of coverage for the
most poverty-stricken groups unable to obtain or pay for private
insurance.
Between 1965 and today, repeated efforts to legislate plans to provide
coverage for further marginal lower-income groups all failed because
there was no political constituency for them strong enough to overcome
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the resistance of the health insurance industry or the professional interests
of other components of the health system. In the same way, legislative
efforts to control costs in the private sector failed to overcome similar
political resistance from well organized and financed professional groups
and the insurance industry. As a result only the cost of Medicare and
Medicaid programs (under direct control of government regulation) could
be controlled to any significant extent.5 Finally, when the cost of health
insurance fringe benefits threatened to damage the competitiveness of
U.S. employers in world markets, insurance companies adopted the
strategy of managed care as a mechanism of cost control through
utilization rationing. Insurers turned to this strategy (seizing on the known
economic advantage of true health maintenance organizations) in order to
maintain their market-share with employers by holding down the rate of
premium increases and simultaneously to improve their own margin of
profit between premiums and benefits paid.
Therefore, because of the piecemeal, uncoordinated way in which the
health insurance system developed in this country, there is no overall legal
or administrative framework for structuring the fiscal or service
relationships between its parts. In particular there is no negotiating
structure, such as in Germany, for reaching compromises between
consumers, payers and providers to achieve collective agreement
regarding mutually acceptable solutions to problems that are in the
general public interest. Thus, the different way in which the insurance
system developed historically in the U.S. and in Germany and the
different cultural settings in which this occurred have led to major
differences in how the two systems work despite great similarity in the
basic components of both. The political power of free-market ideology,
vested interests and lobbying arrangements in the U.S. make it extremely
difficult to legislate reform or impose regulation except in very limited and
specific ways. The failure of cost control through legislative or negotiated
means in turn has led to rationing of budgets and utilization by non-
professionals through managed care by the insurance companies. This was
forced by the need to compete for the business of employer-payers who
are increasingly squeezed by the high cost of fringe benefits. In this way,
allocation decisions have effectively been taken out of the hands of
consumers, providers, employer-payers and even the political system itself.
As a result, without major changes in the balance of power between the
5. See ALFRED E. MILLER, & MARIA G. MILLER, OPTIONS FOR HEALTH
AND HEALTH CARE, (Wiley) (1982) (providing a more complete analysis of the
historical development of the U.S. health care systems and its problems).
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players, there is little chance that traditional ethical considerations
regarding the right to health care can have any real significance in the U.S.
VII. CONCLUSION
Comparative examination of the German and U.S. health systems
makes it clear that the ethics of allocation cannot be realistically
considered without careful analysis of the social structures, payment
mechanisms and cultural traditions within which allocation takes place.
Real change in the allocation of health care to improve social justice in the
U.S. would require long-term political approaches to overcome the
structural resistance to reform within the present system. In particular it
would require reforming the political system itself so that legislative action
could occur to remedy the present inadequacies of allocation and cost
control. Thus, allocation ethics has to be more concerned with the
practical means (e.g., long-term political strategies) for obtaining desirable
ends rather than merely with what would ideally be just in modern society.
Accordingly, the primary ethical issues at stake are how legitimate vested
interests and other deep-rooted obstacles to structural change can be
reconciled with the objectives necessary for the general welfare of the
population, while taking into account the social and economic situation
and institutional arrangements that have developed over time. For
example, how can the need for campaign-finance reform to moderate the
influence of powerful special-interest groups be reconciled with the
Constitutional rights of free speech and unrestricted use of private
property?6 How can the successful free-market orientation of this country
be reconciled with the need for certain forms of overall regulation
necessary to promote the general welfare?
Based on comparison with the German system, one practical step might
be taken for developing potential strategies for improving the allocation of
health service in this country. A standing independent council with input
from all parties concerned could be established to conduct policy
investigations and make recommendations for promoting the overall
public good in health care matters along the lines of the one advising the
national negotiation process in Germany. Given the right mandate such a
6. Of course, special-interest lobbying also plays an important positive role in
bringing particular issues to the attention of Congress and advocating legislation
for the overall public interest. The problem arises when undue amounts of money
are available to support lobbying and public-opinion campaigns in favor of
legislation that benefits only those who have the resources to do so, while being to
the disadvantage of the general public.
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council might be able to devise feasible strategies for reforming the overall
structure of the system to bring the interests of the component parts into
accord with the best interests of society and the economy as a whole. The
only argument likely to influence meaningful political action for bringing
about the needed structural and payment-system reform would be the
credible demonstration that the long-term economic and social good of the
nation requires certain fundamental structural changes in the health care
system as a whole.

